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I. Introduction
Under the theory of subrogation, courts permit one party to stand in
another party's shoes with reference to the former's legal claims or rights.' In
the insurance context, a subrogated insurer stands in the shoes of its insured
and seeks indemnification from third parties whose wrongdoing caused a loss
for which the insurer is obligated to pay.2 An insurer, however, can only be
subrogated in reference to third parties and is barred from pursuing subrogation
claims against its insured when the claim concerns the property for which the
insured is covered.3 However, the clear distinction between the insured and the
1. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 1 (2001) ("Subrogation, a legal fiction, is broadly
defined as the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim
or right."); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS § 162 cmt. a (1937) (stating that the right to subrogation arises when a court, in order to
prevent unjust enrichment, permits a plaintiff, who discharged an obligation owed by the
defendant, to revive the discharged obligation and assume the rights that the obligee had against
the defendant prior to the obligation's discharge).
2. See GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 222:5 (Lee R. Russ in consultation
with Thomas F. Segalla, ed. 2005) (noting that when the insurer stands in the shoes of the
insured, the insurer's legal rights and claims are identical to those of the insured).
3. See Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 807 (Md. 2005) (citing the long
standing legal principle that "an insurer may not recover from its insured, or a co-insured, as
subrogee").
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third party blurs in the landlord-tenant context. What should result if an insurer
reimburses an insured landlord for damage caused by a negligent, uninsured
tenant? The courts are currently split as to whether the insurer may pursue a
subrogation claim against that negligent tenant.
Consider the following hypothetical: Sally rents a townhouse in
Washington, D.C. from Landlord Properties. When entering the lease, Sally
does not discuss fire insurance with Landlord Properties; Sally does not
purchase renter's insurance to cover her for claims of negligence; but Landlord
Properties does procure fire insurance from Ekaps Insurance. One evening
when Sally departs for a benefit dinner, she negligently fails to extinguish a
scented candle. Several hours later when Sally returns, she finds that her
scented candle sparked a fire, reducing the insured structure to a smoldering
pile of ash. After Ekaps Insurance compensates Landlord Properties for the
loss incurred, Ekaps Insurance wishes to pursue a subrogation claim against
Sally.
In responding to this situation, some courts adopt a case-by-case method
of analysis, where on some occasions insurers are subrogated against the
negligent tenant and on other occasions they are not, providing an
unpredictable, unstable approach.4 Other courts adopt a "no-subrogation" rule,
barring insurers from pursuing subrogation claims against negligent tenants,
and allowing the negligent party to enjoy a windfall by virtue of escaping
liability.5 Finally, some courts adopt a "pro-subrogation" rule where insurers
may pursue a subrogation claim against negligent tenants, allocating the loss to
the party responsible for the damage and the party best positioned to avoid such
lOSS.
6
4. See, e.g., id. at 815 (adopting a "middle approach," where courts employ a case-by-
case method of analysis).
5. See, e.g., Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478,482 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (stating that a
tenant is an implied co-insured and that as a result an insurance company cannot pursue a
subrogation claim against the tenant, even if the tenant negligently damaged the insured
structure and thereby caused loss); see also DiLullo v. Joseph, 792 A.2d 819, 822-23 (Conn.
2002) (rejecting Sutton's presumption that a tenant is an implied co-insured, but following
Sutton's result because of the court's concern regarding renter's insurance, especially in a multi-
unit structure, where a tenant would be required to obtain insurance coverage for the
replacement cost of the entire building).
6. See, e.g., Page v. Scott, 567 S.W.2d 101, 103-04 (Ark. 1978) (concluding that real
estate markets set rent prices, not component costs such as insurance premiums, property taxes,
and maintenance expenses, and finding that the lessor and the lessee have separate interests in
the property each of which may be separately insured). Therefore, absent an express or implied
agreement stating otherwise, if a landlord can recover the cost of the damage caused by a
negligent tenant, so too can the insurance company pursue a subrogation claim against a
negligent tenant. Id.
1745
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1743 (2006)
In the abovementioned hypothetical, Sally is clearly the wrongdoer, and
Ekaps Insurance clearly suffers financial detriment when it compensates
Landlord Properties for the detriment Sally caused to the insured structure.
Under these circumstances, should Sally escape liability and enjoy unjust
enrichment merely because Landlord Properties had the foresight to purchase
insurance?7 Or should a court permit Ekaps Insurance's subrogation claim
against Sally, reimbursing the insurer for the compensation it paid to the
insured?8 Or should a court acknowledge that landlord-tenant relationships
vary greatly and that each case's outcome should depend on the reasonable
expectations of the parties in regard to the specific lease, including all the
relevant admissible evidence at issue?9
A situation similar to the above hypothetical arose in Rausch v. Allstate
Insurance Co.'0 In fact, this situation is not novel and courts continue to
resolve this issue in different ways." All of these methods of analysis are
supported by public policy rationales and all of these methods of analysis suffer
from individual inadequacies. As a result, whenever such a situation arises,
courts continue to assign differing weights to each public policy, ultimately
concluding one method is superior to another. In order to resolve the current
inconsistencies in the law, the American Law Institute (ALl) in its Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment should endorse a means of
addressing this issue, providing direction on this issue of legal divergence.1
2
7. See Sutton, 532 P.2d at 482 (concluding that a tenant is an implied co-insured and that
as a result an insurer cannot pursue a subrogation claim against the tenant, even if the tenant
negligently damaged the insured property and thereby caused loss); see also DiLullo, 799 A.2d
at 822-23 (rejecting Sutton's presumption that a tenant is an implied co-insured, but following
Sutton's result because of the court's concern regarding renter's insurance, especially in a multi-
unit structure, where a tenant would be required to obtain insurance coverage for the
replacement cost of the entire building, a cost which may likely prove untenable).
8. See Page, 567 S.W.2d at 103-04 (finding that, absent an express or implied
agreement otherwise, an insurer can pursue a subrogation claim against a negligent tenant).
9. See Rausch, 882 A.2d at 814-15 (adopting a "middle approach," where courts employ
a case-by-case method of analysis that looks "to the reasonable expectations of the parties to the
lease, as determined from the lease itself and any other admissible evidence").
10. See id. at 803 (addressing whether to permit an insurer to pursue a subrogation claim
against a negligent tenant who caused damage and subsequent loss to the insured property, the
court adopted a "middle approach" in which such cases are decided on a case-by-case basis).
11. See infra Part III and accompanying text (exploring exemplary judicial treatment of
the issue, including the case-by-case approach, the "no-subrogation" approach, and "the pro-
subrogation" approach); see also MICHAEL J. KARTER, JR., FIRE Loss IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING 2004 i-iii (Fire Analysis and Research Div. Nat'l Fire Prot. Ass'n, 2005) (stating that in
2004, a fire occurred in a structure every sixty seconds and noting that structure fires caused
$8,314,000,000 in property damage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
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This Note analyzes the current jurisdictional split as to whether, absent an
agreement otherwise, a landlord's insurer may pursue a subrogation claim
against a negligent tenant. In examining this dilemma, this Note explores the
different public policy motivations behind the alternative rules and concludes
that the ALl should adopt the "pro-subrogation" approach. Part II of this Note
defines subrogation and examines its purposes. Part III presents exemplary
judicial treatments of this issue, exploring the three different rules courts
currently apply to the question of whether, absent an agreement otherwise, a
landlord's insurer may pursue a subrogation claim against a negligent tenant.
In Part IV, this Note evaluates both the future implications of the three distinct
rules and the public policy rationales underlying them. With respect to the
public policy rationales, this Note looks to determine the approach that best
promotes subrogation's purpose and which best considers the nature of the
insurance market. Part V counsels that, although this Note focuses on a default
rule solution, all parties at issue could avoid the expense of litigation in the
planning stage through careful and thoughtful drafting. Finally, Part VI
concludes that, in considering the desire for stable and predictable laws, the
purpose of subrogation, and the nature of the insurance market, the ALI, in its
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, should endorse the
"pro-subrogation" approach.
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (addressing proposals for the new restatement, but not addressing
the issue of whether, absent an agreement otherwise, a landlord's insurer may pursue a
subrogation claim against a negligent tenant); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITTmON AND
UNJUST ENRCHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
REsTrrUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (same); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF REsTrrTUoN AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 1,2001) (same). Of the
abovementioned sources, only the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2) addressed subrogation specifically, when it proposed:
If the claimant renders to a third person a performance for which the
defendant would have been liable had the third person asserted a claim against the
defendant directly, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the defendant as
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment if
(a) the claimant acts in the performance of an obligation owed independently
by the claimant to the third person, or otherwise in the reasonable protection of the
claimant's own interests; and
(b) as between the claimant and the defendant, the performance or the part
thereof with respect to which the claimant seeks restitution is primarily the
obligation of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF REsTmTUToN AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
April 1, 2002). The comments and illustrations following RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTTUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 (Tentative Draft No. 2) also fail to propose a
solution to the jurisdictional split at issue. Id.
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11. Subrogation
Subrogation's definition and purpose frame the analysis of whether, absent
an agreement otherwise, a landlord's insurer may pursue a subrogation claim
against a negligent tenant. This Part does not argue that the ALl should
endorse a case-by-case rule, a "no-subrogation" rule, or a "pro-subrogation"
rule. Rather, this Part merely presents the traditional definition and purpose of
subrogation, with specific reference to the insurance setting.
A. Subrogation Defined
Subrogation is a settled legal principle standing for the following
proposition: "Where the property of one person is used in discharging an
obligation owed by another ... under such circumstances that the other would
be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the former is
entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee."'13  Stated
metaphorically, subrogation permits one party to stand in the shoes of another
with reference to the former's legal claims or rights.' 4 The law has recognized
two types of subrogation: "conventional" subrogation and "legal" or
"equitable" subrogation.' 5 Conventional subrogation arises out of a contract in
which one party, who has no relation to the specific matter, pays the debt of
13. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 162
(1937).
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26 cmt. f,
illus. 30 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Apr. 1, 2002) (providing an illustration about general
contractual subrogation in insurance). The Restatement stated:
Lessee occupies Blackacre under a lease by which Lessee agrees to indenify
Lessor against any loss caused by Lessee's use of the premises. A fire originating
on Blackacre, without the fault of the Lessee, damages Whiteacre, an adjoining
tract also owned by Lessor. Lessor's Insurer pays for the damage to Whiteacre,
then seeks reimbursement from Lessee. The court determines that Lessee has no
liability in tort, but that the indemnification provision of the lease covers the loss in
question. Insurer has a claim against Lessee under this Section, via subrogation to
Lessor's rights under the lease.
Id.; see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 1 (2001) ("Subrogation, a legal fiction, is broadly
defined as the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim
or right.").
15. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 3 (2001) (noting that the law has recognized
"conventional" and "legal" or "equitable" subrogation and in some jurisdictions the legislature
has enacted "statutory" subrogation); see also Wasko v. Manella, 849 A.2d 777, 781-82 (Conn.
2004) (citing Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 672 A.2d 939 (Conn. 1996)) (noting
that if the insurer is permitted to pursue a subrogation claim against the negligent tenant such
action is based in "equitable" and not "conventional" subrogation).
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another, and by agreement subsequently assumes the rights and remedies of the
original creditor.' 6 Equitable subrogation, however, arises out of equitable
principles, with or without a specific agreement.17 Such action "includes every
instance in which one person, not acting voluntarily, has paid a debt for which
another was primarily liable and which in equity and good conscience should
have been discharged by the latter.' 8 In the insurance setting, when an insurer
covers a loss of the insured, the insurer assumes all of the insured's rights and
claims against the third party, who through negligence or wrongful conduct
caused the damage, irrespective of whether the insurer would have been
entitled to bring the suit itself.' 9 It is important to note that an insurer, who out
of a preexisting obligation reimburses an insured for losses caused by a
negligent third party, pursues an equitable subrogation claim against the
wrongdoer, not a conventional one.2°
B. Subrogation's Purpose
Subrogation has "for its purpose the working out of an equitable
adjustment between the parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a debt by
the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it.",2' In the
insurance context, subrogation's purpose implicates the perspectives of three
16. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 4 (2001) (stating that "conventional" subrogation is
contractual, but may arise out of express or implied agreement where "an obligee, who receives
performance from a third party, subrogates that person to his rights, even without obligor's
consent").
17. See id. § 5 ("'Equitable subrogation' is not a matter of contract and does not arise
from any contractual relationship between the parties, but rather, it takes place as a matter of
equity.").
18. Id.
19. See COUCH, supra note 2, § 222:5 (discussing the insurer's role in subrogation).
Couch stated:
Accordingly, on paying a loss, an insurer is subrogated in a corresponding amount
to the insured's right of action against any other person responsible for the loss,
such that the insurer is entitled to bring an action against this third party whose
negligent or other tortious or wrongful conduct caused the loss, regardless of
whether the insurer would have been entitled to bring such an action in its own
right.
Id.
20. See Wasko v. Manella, 849 A.2d 777, 781-82 (Conn. 2004) ("[I]nsurers that are
obligated by a preexisting contract to pay the losses of an insured proceed in a subsequent
action against the responsible party under the theory of equitable subrogation, and not
conventional subrogation.").
21. COUCH, supra note 2, § 222:8.
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parties: the insured, the tortfeasor, and the insurer.22 In regard to the insured,
subrogation operates to prevent unjust enrichment, where the insured would
recover both from the insurer and the tortfeasor.23 In regard to the tortfeasor,
subrogation assures that the wrongdoer will be held legally responsible for the
damages caused, blocking the potential windfall of escaping liability merely
because the insured had the foresight to purchase insurance for his own
24protection. Finally, in regard to the insurer, subrogation reimburses the
insurer for payments it has made to the insured in order to remedy the damage
caused by a third party.25
Additional wrinkles complicate subrogation's purpose in the landlord-
tenant context. First, the insurer cannot purse a subrogation claim against the
insured.26 This naturally follows because the insurer contractually accepted the
risk of loss resulting from the insured's negligence, and equity bars an insurer's
claim of re-indemnification.27 Therefore, under traditional subrogation theory,
when a party other than the insured damages the insured property and the
insurer compensates the insured, the insurer remains subrogated to the
insured's claim against the wrongdoer.28 Second, courts are abandoning the
traditional rule with increasing frequency and are barring the insurer's
subrogation claim by concluding that the wrongdoer is an "implied" or "quasi"
co-insured. 29 Although courts invoke the implied or quasi co-insured legal
22. See id. (stating that "subrogation's purpose has been described from the perspective of
the insured, the tortfeasor, and the insurer, often in terms of the effect of the other parties or in
combination").
23. See id. (noting that although there is authority to the contrary, from the insured's
perspective subrogation has the objective to prevent double recovery).
24. See id. (discussing that from the tortfeasor's perspective, "a wrongdoer who is legally
responsible for the harm should not receive the windfall of being absolved from liability because
the insured had the foresight to obtain, and had paid the expense of procuring, insurance for his
or her perspective.").
25. See id. (noting that when an insurer compensates an insured for damage caused by a
third party, it is only equitable for the insurer to seek reimbursement).
26. See James M. Fischer, The Presence of Insurance and the Legal Allocation of
Risk, 2 CoNN. INS. L.J. 1, 5 (1996) (discussing the general rule, in American jurisdictions,
that there is no subrogation against the insured).
27. See id. (noting that because the insurer contractually "accepted the risk and agreed to
indemnify the insured from loss (within contract limits) if the loss occurs (i.e., the risk is
realized), the insurer cannot seek reindemnification from the insured under general equity
theories of indemnity, contribution or subrogation"). Fischer also notes, however, that when an
insured's actions cause loss, such actions may provide the insurer with a contractual defense that
would deny the insured the right to collect under the insurance policy. Id.
28. See id. at 6-7 (citing a diagram in which "the insurer indemnifies the victim for the
loss and is in turn subrogated to the victim's claim against the wrongdoer").
29. See id. at 7 (noting that courts are employing the "no subrogation against the insured"
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fiction in few contexts, one of those contexts is the landlord-tenant
relationship.30 This Note will discuss how the implied co-insured legal fiction
in the landlord-tenant context violates subrogation's original purpose and will
argue that the ALI should recommend its abolition.
III. Exemplary Judicial Treatment of the Issue
An examination of the three primary treatments that the courts employ to
resolve this issue will properly introduce the competing public policies at play.
First, some courts adopt a case-by-case method of analysis, favoring an
individualized decision-making process that fails to provide stability and
predictability. 31 Second, other courts employ a "no-subrogation" rule, invoking
differing rationales, such as the implied co-insured legal fiction rationale,32 or
the economic waste and reasonable expectations of the parties rationale.33
Finally, some courts adopt a "pro-subrogation" rule, permitting the insurer's
subrogation claim against a negligent tenant, thus upholding traditional
subrogation law.
34
rule to prevent the insurer from pursuing a subrogation claim against the wrongdoer claiming
the wrongdoer is an "implied" or "quasi" co-insured).
30. See id. (proposing that "[iln general, creation of implied or quasi co-insureds has been
limited to situations where a relationship exists between the named insured and the tortfeasor,
such as that of landlord-tenant, contractor-subcontractor, and vendor-vendee").
31. See, e.g., Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801,814-15 (Md. 2005) (adopting a
"middle approach," where courts employ a case-by-case method of analysis); Union Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Joerg, 824 A.2d 586, 589-90 (Vt. 2003) (same); Bannock Bldg. Co. v. Sahlberg, 887
P.2d 1052, 1056 (Idaho 1994) (same); Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. v. Vaszil, 873 A.2d 1030,
1033-34 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005), rev'd and remanded, 900 A.2d 513 (Conn. 2006) (same); Fire
Ins. Exch. v. Hammond, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 600-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (same).
32. See, e.g., Sutton v. Johdahl, 532 P.2d 478,482 (stating that a tenant is an implied co-
insured and as a result an insurance company cannot pursue a subrogation claim against the
tenant, even if the tenant negligently damaged the insured structure and thereby caused loss);
Tri-Par Invs., L.L.C. v. Sousa, 680 N.W.2d 190, 198-200 (Neb. 2004) (same); N. River Ins. Co.
v. Snyder, 804 A.2d 399, 403-04 (Me. 2002) (same); Peterson v. Silva, 704 N.E.2d 1163,
1165-66 (Mass. 1999) (same); Cmty. Credit Union v. Homelvig, 487 N.W.2d 602, 604-05
(N.D. 1992) (same); GNS P'ship v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1163-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(same); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bruggeman, 505 N.W.2d 87, 88-90 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(same); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Raboin, 712 A.2d 1011, 1016-17 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (same).
33. See, e.g., DiLullo v. Joseph, 792 A.2d 819, 822-23 (Conn. 2002) (rejecting Sutton's
presumption that a tenant is a co-insured, but following Sutton's result because of the tenant's
concern regarding renter's insurance, especially in multi-unit structures, where a tenant would
be required to obtain insurance coverage for the replacement cost of the entire building, a cost
which may likely prove untenable).
34. See, e.g., Page v. Scott, 567 S.W.2d 101, 103-04 (Ark. 1978) (rejecting the co-
insured legal fiction). In rejecting the co-insured legal fiction the court noted that the market
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A. The Case-by-Case Approach
The first group of courts decline to adopt a "no-subrogation" rule or "pro-
subrogation" rule, alternatively opting to endorse a "middle approach" that
employs a case-by-case method of analysis. In Rausch, the Maryland Court of
Appeals consolidated two cases in which it decided whether to permit an
insurance company to pursue a subrogation claim against a tenant who
negligently caused damage to property insured by the landlord.35 In Rausch,
the Rausches entered into a six-month lease for property managed by Relo
Realty and owned by John Dunlop.36 During the lease, Mrs. Rausch left the
rented property, negligently failing to remove a flammable item from the rear
burner of the electric range, a burner which was set on "high. 3 7 The electric
range sparked a fire that caused $152,000 worth of damage, of which Allstate
Insurance paid Dunlop $138,000.38 Allstate next sought to enforce a
subrogation clause against the Rausches.39
In Hartford Mutual Insurance Co. v. Harkins, the companion case, Janice
Harkins entered into a one-year lease for an apartment in a multi-unit
building.40 During the term of the lease, Ms. Harkins lit a scented candle in her
bedroom and then left the room to answer a telephone call.41 While on the
phone, Ms. Harkins ignored the sounding smoke detector, dismissing it as a
false alarm.42 When Ms. Harkins realized that her bedspread was on fire, she
made a failed attempt to extinguish the blaze.43 Hartford Insurance ultimately
sets rent prices, not component costs. Id. The court also found that the lessor and the lessee
have separate interests in the property each of which may be separately insured. Id. Finally, the
court concluded that, absent an agreement otherwise, as a landlord can recover the cost of the
damage caused by a negligent tenant so too can the insurance company pursue a subrogation
claim against a negligent tenant. Id. Osborne v. Chapman, 574 N.W.2d 64, 67-68 (Minn.
1998) (rejecting the co-insured legal fiction); Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W.2d 87, 89-90
(Iowa 1992) (same); Zoppi v. Traurig, 598 A.2d 19, 21-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990)
(same); Regent Ins. Co. v. Econ. Preferred Ins. Co., 749 F. Supp. 191, 195 (C.D. I11. 1990)
(same).
35. See Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 803 (Md. 2005) (deciding "under what
circumstances, if any, the insurer may pursue its contractual right of subrogation against a tenant
of the insured who negligently damaged the insured premises and thereby caused the loss").
36. Id.
37. Id. at 804.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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paid the owner of the building $83,000.44 Hartford next pursued a subrogation
claim against Ms. Harkins.45 In resolving these two cases, the court adopted a
"middle approach" and concluded that such cases should be decided using a
case-by-case method of analysis.46
In its legal analysis, the court rejected the "no-subrogation" and "pro-
subrogation" rules as rigid, per se approaches.47 Rather, the court favored a
flexible, case-by-case analysis that looked "to the reasonable expectations of the
parties to the lease, as determined from the lease itself and any other admissible
evidence.,48  The court buttressed its holding by arguing that its rule
"avoids... making assumptions and adopting fictions that are largely
conjectural, if not patently illogical, and instead applies basic contract
principles and gives proper credence to the equitable underpinning of the whole
doctrine of subrogation. ,
49
In its analysis, the court laid out a set of guiding principles to advise future
courts. First, the court concluded that absent an agreement otherwise, landlords
and tenants are not implied co-insureds as a matter of law.50 The court
deconstructed the Sutton v. Jondah15' rationale, noting that: (a) the tenant's
insurable interest in continued possession of the leased property does not make
the tenant a co-insured; 52 (b) a tenant in the landlord-tenant context is not
properly analogous to a permissive user in the automobile context; 53 and
(c) courts that label tenants as implied co-insureds for the sole purpose of
barring a subrogation action are relying upon a tenuous, "unsupportable legal
44. Id. at 805-06.
45. Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 806 (Md. 2005).
46. Id. at 815.




50. See Rausch, 882 A.2d at 815 (noting that the implied co-insured legal fiction has "no
valid foundation" as a matter of law).
51. See Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (holding that a
tenant is an implied co-insured and consequently an insurer cannot pursue a subrogation claim
against the tenant, even if the tenant negligently damaged the insured property and thereby
caused loss); see also supra Part III.B. 1 and accompanying text (summarizing Sutton's legal
analysis and holding).
52. See Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 815 (Md. 2005) (stating that if a fire
renders the leased structure uninhabitable, "the tenant would have no right of recovery under the
landlord's policy for the loss of possession, unless the policy provides such coverage").
53. See id. (arguing that unlike the default landlord-tenant relationship, "[p]ermissive
users are regarded as insureds under such a policy because the policy expressly provides
coverage for them, usually by including them in the definition of 'insured"').
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fiction., 54 Second, the court concluded that an insurer's subrogation claim
against a negligent tenant may further public policy, not frustrate it." Third,
the court stated two caveats: (a) general contract laws apply regarding
construing ambiguous provisions against the draftsman and invalidating
contracts of adhesion that violate public policy; 56 and (b) no right to
subrogation exists "save [where] there is liability in the first instance by the
tenant to the landlord. 57 Finally, the court created the presumption that in a
large multi-unit structure, absent a provision otherwise, the parties reasonably
expect the landlord to procure proper fire insurance.58 Therefore, the court
found:
Within the construct of these principles, a court must look at the lease as a
whole, along with any other relevant and admissible evidence, to determine
if it was reasonably anticipated by the landlord and the tenant that the
tenant would be liable, in the event of a fire loss paid by the landlord's
insurer, to a subrogation claim by the insurer.
59
Ultimately, if the parties reasonably anticipated that the landlord's insurance
policy would cover the tenant, the court barred the insurer's subrogation claim,
otherwise the court permitted it.
B. The "No-Subrogation" Approach
The second group of courts bar insurers from bringing claims against
tenants, even those who negligently cause damage to an insured structure and
thereby cause loss. Of the range of rationales the "no-subrogation" courts
invoke, this Note examines two principal examples. First, a court prohibits
such action when it invokes the legal fiction that a tenant is an implied co-
insured party and as such the insurer cannot pursue a subrogation claim against
54. Id.
55. See id. (noting that "equitable principles... if anything, favor the enforcement of
subrogation claims by insurers," absent two caveats).
56. See id. at 815-16 (discussing that the first caveat concerned issues of general contract
law, such as ambiguities, which are construed against the draftsman and contracts of adhesion,
which violate public policy and are invalid).
57. Rausch, 882 A.2d at 816.
58. See id. at 816 ("If the leased premises is a unit within a multi-unit structure, absent a
clear, enforceable provision to the contrary, a court may properly conclude that the parties
anticipated and reasonably expected that the landlord would have in place adequate fire
insurance covering the entire building.").
59. Id.
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her.6° Second, a court prohibits such action when it embraces the same result
but relies on a different rationale that disfavors economic waste and looks to the
parties' reasonable expectations. 1
1. The Implied Co-Insured Rationale
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals created the legal fiction that a tenant is
an implied co-insured in Sutton v. Jondahl, and consequently found that
insurers are barred from pursuing subrogation claims against tenants, even if
the tenant negligently damaged the insured property and thereby caused loss.
62
In Sutton, John Jondahl rented a house from the Suttons.63 On January 17,
1970, Jondahl's ten year-old son, when playing with an electric popcorn popper
and a chemical set, negligently ignited his bedroom curtains, sparking a fire that
caused $2,382.57 in damages. 64 Central Mutual Insurance Company, from
which the Suttons procured fire insurance for the damaged structure, paid the
loss as obligated under its policy.65 After reimbursing the Suttons for the
covered loss, Central Mutual Insurance pursued a subrogation action against
Jondahl and his son.66
In its legal analysis, the court first examined the principle of subrogation,
noting its equitable roots and fluid nature.67 Next, without citation, the court
found that: "Under the facts and circumstances in this record the subrogation
should not be available to the insurance carrier because the law considers the
tenant as a co-insured of the landlord absent an express agreement between
60. See, e.g., Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478,482 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (holding that a
tenant is an implied co-insured and consequently an insurer cannot pursue a subrogation claim
against the tenant, even if the tenant negligently damaged the insured property and thereby
caused loss).
61. See, e.g., DiLullo v. Joseph, 792 A.2d 819, 822-23 (Conn. 2002) (favoring a default
rule that embraces a "policy against economic waste" and that considers that "in most instances,
neither landlords nor tenants ordinarily expect that the landlord's insurer would be proceeding
against the tenant, unless expert counseling to that effect had forewarned them").
62. See Sutton, 532 P.2d at 482 (stating that a tenant is an implied co-insured and that as a
result an insurance company cannot pursue a subrogation claim against a tenant, even if the
tenant negligently damaged the insured structure and thereby caused loss).
63. Id. at 479.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. (noting that the insurance company alleged negligence against both Jondahl
and his son).
67. See Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478,481-82 (Okla. Civ.App. 1975) (characterizing
subrogation as "begotten of a union between equity and her beloved-the natural justice of
placing the burden of bearing a loss where it ought to be").
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them to the contrary, comparable to the permissive-user feature of automobile
insurance.'68 The court derived the implied co-insured principle from the
"relational reality" between the landlord and the tenant, noting that because the
landlords have fee interests and tenants have possessory interests, both parties,
through their relationship, have insurable interests in the property.69 Further,
the court concluded that as "a matter of sound business practice" any premium
paid for by a landlord trickles down to the tenant as a portion of rent
payments. 70 Next, relying upon what the court described as the "realities of
urban apartment and single-family dwelling renting," the court concluded that,
absent an express agreement otherwise, tenants depend upon landlords to
procure fire insurance. 71 To bolster its contention, the court argued that
insurance companies themselves understand this relationship, evidenced by a
lack of insurance salesmen peddling fire insurance policies to tenants.72 In
conclusion, the court determined that in the spirit of equity and fundamental
justice, a fire insurance policy for a property, absent an express agreement73
otherwise, protects all joint owners and all those with possessory interests. As
a result, "[t]he company affording such coverage should not be allowed to shift
a fire loss to an occupying tenant even if the latter negligently caused it."
74
68. Id. at 482.
69. See id. (arguing that the implied co-insured principle "is derived from a recognition of
a relational reality, namely, that both landlord and tenant have an insurable interest in the rented
premises-the former owns the fee and the latter has a possessory interest").
70. See id. (proposing that according to business practice, the landlord's fire insurance
premium payments "had to be considered in establishing the rent rate on the rental unit...
chargeable against the rent as overhead or operating expense... [and] it follows.., that the
tenant actually paid the premium as part of the monthly rental").
71. Id.
72. See Sutton, 532 P.2d at 482 (stating that if such coverage was not the status quo,
insurance companies "would have long ago made such need a matter of common knowledge by
promoting the sale to tenants of a second fire insurance policy to cover the real estate").
73. See id. ("[E]quity and fundamental justice upon which the equitable doctrine of
subrogation is established requires that when fire insurance is provided for a dwelling it protects
the insurable interests of all joint owners including the possessory interests of a tenant absent an
express agreement by the latter to the contrary.").
74. Id.
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2. The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties and Economic
Waste Rationale
In DiLullo v. Joseph,75 the Connecticut Supreme Court, as a matter of law and
policy, followed the result in Sutton, but, as a matter of insurance and contract law,
rejected the Sutton rationale.76 In DiLullo, Michael Joseph rented commercial
property from Michael and Fioretta DiLullo from December 1, 1995 to December 1,
1996." Following the expiration of the lease, the parties continued the rental
agreement on a month-to-month basis. 78 There was no agreement between the
parties regarding fire insurance coverage.79 On March 24, 1998, Joseph negligently
sparked a fire that damaged the premises causing losses, which the plaintiffs, Public
Service Mutual Insurance Co., partially covered.80 Following these payments, the
insurance company pursued a subrogation action against Michael Joseph.81 The
issue for the court concemed whether, as a default rule, an insurer has a subrogation
claim against a tenant who negligently damages the insured property.
82
The court based its result on two rationales: (1) the public policy disfavoring
economic waste;83 and (2) the landlord's and tenant's reasonable expectations
concerning an insurer's right to subrogation.84 First, citing the long held public
policy against economic waste, the court expressed concern about a default rule that
would encourage duplicative insurance.85 The court reasoned that a "pro-
75. See DiLullo v. Joseph, 792 A.2d 819, 822 (Conn. 2002) (rejecting Sutton's implied
co-insured presumption, but following Sutton's result). The court agreed with the "criticism of
the Sutton rationale, as a matter of the general principles of insurance and contract law," noting
that "a tenant is not a coinsured on his landlord's fire insurance policy simply because he has an
insurable interest in the premises and pays rent." Id. But, the court ultimately upheld the Sutton
result as a matter of subrogation law and policy. Id.
76. See id. at 822 (rejecting Sutton's presumption that a tenant is an implied co-insured,
but following Sutton's result because of the court's concern regarding renter's insurance).
77. See id. at 819-20 (noting that Joseph operated his business, Random Remnants, out of
the leased property).
78. Id. at 820.
79. Id.
80. DiLullo, 792 A.2d at 820.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 821 (discussing that the question posed on appeal was "what the appropriate
default rule of law should be where, as here, the parties have not made such an agreement
[allocating specific risks and coverages]").
83. See id. at 822 (noting that the policy against economic waste has long been recognized
in American jurisprudence).
84. See id. at 823 (citing Judge Keeton and Professor Widiss who argued that "neither
landlords nor tenants ordinarily expect that the landlord's insurer would be proceeding against
the tenant, unless expert counseling to that effect had forewarned them").
85. See DiLullo v. Joseph, 792 A.2d 819, 822-23 (Conn. 2002) (discussing that
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subrogation" rule, which allocates responsibility to the tenant for her negligent
behavior, incentivizes that tenant to procure coverage for insurer subrogation
claims.8 6 Therefore, the court concluded that this default rule strongly encouraged
both the landlord and each tenant to purchase separate insurance policies covering
the same structure. 87 The court found that such duplicative insurance constituted
economic waste that violated notions of policy and fairness, violations that are
greatly compounded in multi-unit buildings where there are potentially hundreds of
units.
88
Second, the court looked to the reasonable expectations of the landlord and the
tenant as a rationale for upholding the "no-subrogation" approach. The court noted
that, absent expert legal advice, a majority of tenants do not enter into landlord-
tenant relationships under the expectation that the landlord's insurer will pursue a
subrogation lawsuit against them.89 "Thus, barring subrogation in such a case
comports with the equities of most situations."90  Relying on both of the
aforementioned equitable principles, the court found in favor of the "no-
subrogation" rule and barred subrogation in this context. 9'
C. The "Pro-Subrogation"Approach
The third group of courts adopt a "pro-subrogation" rule. In Page v.
Scott,92 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that, absent an express agreement in
subrogation, as an equitable doctrine, disfavors economic waste such as duplicative insurance).
86. See id. ("Such a rule... create[s] a strong incentive for every tenant to carry liability
insurance in an amount necessary to compensate for the value, or perhaps even the replacement
cost, of an entire building, irrespective of the portion of the building occupied by the tenant.").
87. See id. at 823 (noting that the default rule permitting subrogation would create strong
incentives for tenants to purchase insurance policies for structures for which the landlord
already has insurance and that such duplicative insurance constitutes economic waste, violating
notions of policy and fairness).
88. See id. ("[I]t surely is not in the public interest to require all the tenants to insure the
building which they share, thus causing the building to be fuilly insured by each tenancy.");
Road Runner, 41st Street: A New York Songline, http://home.nyc.rr.com/jkn/nysonglines/
41 st.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (noting that River Place 1 is the largest apartment building
in the United States, with 921 units totaling 908,000 square feet) (on file with the Wasington
and Lee Law Review).
89. See DiLullo, 792 A.2d at 822-23 (citing Judge Keeton's and Professor Widiss's
argument that "neither landlords nor tenants ordinarily expect that the landlord's insurer would
be proceeding against the tenant, unless expert counseling to that effect had forewarned them").
90. Id.
91. See id. ("[B]arring subrogation in such a case comports with the equities of most
situations.").
92. See Page v. Scott, 567 S.W.2d 101, 103-04 (Ark. 1978) (rejecting Sutton's implied
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the lease to the contrary, a landlord's insurer may pursue a subrogation claim against a
negligent tenant. 93 In Page, under an oral lease, Scott leased property owned by
Page.94 During the lease, Scott negligently created a fire that caused $8,050 in
damage.95 Hartford Insurance Co., consistent with its preexisting fire insurance policy
with Page, paid Page $8,000 to compensate him for the damage.96 Next Page sued
Scott for the entire extent of the damages.97 As a defense, Scott claimed that Page's
insurance policy was procured for the mutual benefit of both Page and Scott and
therefore Page could only seek relief under the insurance policy.
98
The court distilled this dispute into a single issue: whether, absent an agreement
otherwise, a landlord procures fire insurance for personal benefit or also for the mutual
benefit of the tenant.99 In addressing this issue, the court concluded that "[t]he lessor
and the lessee each had an insurable interest in the property, independent ofthe other,
and either, or both, may separately insure his interest for his own benefit."' 00
Recognizing the separate insurance interests, the court rejected the implied co-insured
legal fiction, dismissing the argument that rent payments impliedly include insurance
premiums and subsequent insurance coverage.' ' In dismissing this legal fiction, a
fiction many courts embraced after Sutton, the court found that "[t]here is no evidence
that [the tenant] paid any greater rent because of the insurance than he would have paid
had [the landlord] not taken insurance. ,02 The court argued that component costs-
such as property taxes, construction costs, maintenance expenses, acquisition costs,
and insurance premiums-do not set rent prices but rather that a dynamic real estate
market of willing lessors and lessees negotiate such rent prices.10 3 Consequently, a
co-insured presumption and adopting a "pro-subrogation" approach).
93. See id. at 103-04 (rejecting Sutton's implied co-insured rationale as a legal fiction,
noting that the markets set rent prices, not the compenent costs such as insurance premiums,
property taxes, and maintenance expenses).
94. Id. at 102.
95. Id.
96. See id. (noting that Page's fire insurance policy covered damages in excess of fifty
dollars).
97. Page, 567 S.W. 2d at 102.
98. See id. (noting that Scott's real basis of his defense was that "the policy was procured
for the mutual benefit of the lessor and the lessee with the implied agreement that Page would
look solely to the insurance policy in case of loss by fire and not to the lessee").
99. See id. at 103 ("The only issue then, is whether the insurance taken by the lessor was
for the benefit of both parties.").
100. Id.
101. See id. at 103-04 (arguing that "[t]he fiction that by paying the rent, the lessee paid
the insurance premium is not appropriate").
102. Page v. Scott, 567 S.W. 2d 101, 104 (Ark. 1978).
103. See id. (contending that market forces, and not component costs, fix rent prices).
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lessor may pursue a claim against a negligent lessee and thereby recover damages for
the loss.1°4 Ultimately, the court permitted Page's suit against Scott and entered
judgment for the full amount of damages, $8,050.'05 Thus, as stated in Page, absent
an agreement otherwise, a landlord procures fire insurance for personal benefit only,
not also for the mutual benefit of the tenant; consequently, the landlord's insurer
remains free to pursue a subrogation claim against a tenant whose negligence damages
the insured property'0
6
IV Analysis of the Rules: Considering Both Their Future Implications and Their
Public Policy Rationales
When determining which rule to adopt the ALI should consider each approach's
future implications and public policy rationales. First, in regards to the future
implications, the ALI should endorse a bright line rule that provides stability and
predictability, rather than a muddied, middle approach that punts the balancing of
interests to future judicial discretion. Second, the ALI should examine the competing
public policy rationales that support each approach and select the one that best
promotes subrogation's purpose and that best considers the nature of the insurance
market.
A. The Case-by-Case Approach: Unstable, Unpredictable, and Unacceptable
As a general matter, law ought to be stable and predictable. 107 Therefore, when a
court decides an issue, it should do so in reference to a concrete rule. When courts,
such as the one in Rausch, adopt a case-by-case method of analysis, they insert
104. See id. at 103-04 (concluding that because absent an agreement otherwise, a lessor
procures fire insurance for personal benefit, and not also the mutual benefit of the lessee, here
the lessor may recover from the lessee for fire damage caused by the lessee's negligence).
105. See id. at 104 (reversing the trial court's denial of recovery and entering judgment in
favor of the lessor for the full amount of his damages).
106. See id. at 103-04 (noting that the court favored a "pro-subrogation" default rule).
107. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 12-15 (Duke Univ.
Press, 2001) (asserting that society benefits from stability when it resolves concrete moral
disagreements and uncertainties with authoritative settlements); see also RONALD CASS, THE
RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA II (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2001) (arguing that the goal of
the rule of law should be principled predictability providing "predictability that is adequate to
allow individuals to plan their lives"); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 539
(1988) ("One of the things that can be said for rules is the value variously expressed as
predictability or certainty."). But see Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Joerg, 824 A.2d 586, 589-90
(Vt. 2003) (citing the need to avoid per se rules in favor of flexibility and emphasizing the need
to examine the parties' reasonable expectations as the determinative factor).
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too much judicial discretion into the system, fostering disagreement and
uncertainty and undermining the basic rule of law. 08 The court in Rausch
should have committed to either the "no-subrogation" result or the "pro-
subrogation" result, rather than committing to a "middle approach" that
provides no result at all. The court compromised on this muddied, middle
approach because it concluded that the wide variety of circumstances under
which this issue arises present "a clash between what a direct application of
basic and well-established legal principles would produce and what the courts
have come to regard as either impractical or inequitable to tenants, or at least
certain classes of tenants."10 9 Many, if not most, courts acknowledge the split
in authority between the "no-subrogation" rule and the "pro-subrogation" rule,
concluding that both rules are supported by persuasive public policy arguments.
Nonetheless many still adopt a rule. Because this muddied, middle approach
punts the balancing of interests to the judicial discretion of future courts-
creating an unstable, unpredictable legal climate-it flunks the future
implications prong of this Note's two-tier analysis.
Second, in addition to failing the future implications prong of this Note's
analysis, the case-by-case approach permits a "no-subrogation" result-a result
that frustrates subrogation's purpose. As discussed in Part II.B, subrogation
has "for its purpose the working out of an equitable adjustment between the
parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a debt by the person who in equity
and good conscience ought to pay it."1 0  In the insurance context,
subrogation's purpose implicates three parties: the insured, the tortfeasor, and
the insurer. 1 ' Of particular importance here, subrogation (a) assures that the
tortfeasor will be held legally responsible for the loss by virtue of blocking the
windfall of escaping liability and (b) reimburses the insurer for payments made
to the insured when such compensation stems from third party damage.'
12
108. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 107, at 13 (arguing that "concrete
disagreements and uncertainties about the more particular shapes of moral principles and about
factual matters resulted in. .. disagreements and uncertainties [which] are potentially quite
destructive").
109. Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 803 (Md. 2005).
110. COUCH, supra note 2, § 222:8.
111. See id. (discussing that "subrogation's purpose has been described from the
perspective of the insured, the tortfeasor, and the insurer, often in terms of the effect of the other
parties or in combination"); see also supra Part II.B and accompanying text (same).
112. See COUCH, supra note 2, § 222:8 (discussing that from the tortfeasor's perspective, "a
wrongdoer who is legally responsible for the harm should not receive the windfall of being
absolved from liability because the insured had the foresight to obtain, and had paid the expense
of procuring, insurance for his or her perspective"); see also supra Part II.B and accompanying
text (same).
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However, when the case-by-case approach permits a "no-subrogation" result:
(a) the tortfeasor enjoys the windfall of escaping liability; and (b) the insurer
may not seek reimbursement for compensation paid as a result of third party
damage. Because the case-by-case analysis shields some tortfeasing tenants
from liability, it directly frustrates subrogation's purpose and fails the second
prong of this Note's two-tier analysis. Consequently, the ALI should reject this
approach.
B. The "No-Subrogation" Approach: Stable, Predictable, but Based
on Improper Rationales
First, courts that adopt the "no-subrogation" approach endorse a bright line
rule, providing stable and predictable results. 1 3 Consequently, these courts
pass the future implications prong of this Note's two-tier analysis. Second,
although the "no-subrogation" courts provide a stable, predictable rule, the
various public policy rationales they invoke undermine subrogation's purpose
and rely on mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of the insurance market.
Because the "no-subrogation" approach fails the second prong of this Note's
two-tier analysis, the ALI should reject this standard.
1. The Implied Co-Insured Rationale: Stable, Predictable, but Frustrating
to Subrogation's Purpose and Mistaken as to the Nature of the
Insurance Market
The ALI should reject the Sutton approach because it: (1) frustrates
subrogation's purpose and (2) relies on mistaken assumptions about the nature
of the insurance market. First, because the implied co-insured rationale
produces a "no-subrogation" result, shielding all tortfeasing tenants from
liability, it frustrates subrogation's purpose. Under the implied co-insured
rationale: (a) the "implied co-insured" tortfeasing tenant enjoys the windfall of
escaping liability; and (b) the insurer may not seek reimbursement for
compensation paid as a result of third party damage. Therefore, because the
implied co-insured rationale shields the tortfeasing tenant from liability, it
directly frustrates subrogation's purpose and partially fails the second prong of
this Note's two-tier analysis.
113. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text ("In regard to the tortfeasor, subrogation
assures that the wrongdoer will be held legally responsible for the damages caused, blocking the
potential windfall of escaping liability merely because the insured had the foresight to purchase
insurance for his own protection.").
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Second, in addition to frustrating subrogation's purpose, the implied co-
insured rationale relies on mistaken assumptions about the nature of the
insurance market. 114 The Sutton court derived the implied co-insured principle
from "a recognition of a relational reality, namely, that both landlord and tenant
have an insurable interest in the rented premises-the former owns the fee and
the latter has a possessory interest.""l 5 Bolstering its conclusion, the court
analogized the landlord-tenant relationship in the fire insurance context to the
permissive-user relationship in the automobile insurance context. 16 The court
concluded that rent payments necessarily include a fire insurance premium
component and proclaimed that, absent an agreement otherwise, equity and
fundamental justice demand that fire insurance protects all joint owners and all
those with possessory interests in the property." 7 However, many, if not most
courts in this jurisdictional split have rejected Sutton's legal reasoning. The
court in Rausch, in concluding that the implied co-insured rationale had "no
valid foundation," noted:
Sutton, the leading modem case denying subrogation of lessees, cites no
cases for the proposition that the lessee is a co-insured of the lessor,
comparable to a permissive user under an auto insurance policy. Contrary
to the court's statement, the fact both parties had insurable interests does
not make them co-insureds. The insurer has a right to choose whom it will
insure and did not choose to insure the lessees, and under this holding the
lessee could have sued the insurer for loss due to damage to the realty, e.g.,
loss of use if [the] policy provides such coverage.' 1s
The court added that "[i] f the tenant were a co-insured, he/she would be entitled
to some part of the proceeds, which even the Sutton followers have not
suggested."" 9 Next, the Page court concluded that dynamic markets, and not
114. See Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) ("Under the facts
and circumstances in this record the subrogation should not be available to the insurance carrier
because the law considers the tenant as a co-insured of the landlord absent an express agreement
between them to the contrary ....
115. Id.
116. See id. ("Under the facts and circumstances in this record the subrogation should not
be available to the insurance carrier because the law considers the tenant as a co-insured of the
landlord absent an express agreement between them to the contrary, comparable to the
permissive-user feature of automobile insurance.").
117. See supra Part III.B. I and accompanying text ("(T]he court concluded that.., any
premium paid for by a landlord trickles down to the tenant as a portion of rent payments... and
that, absent an express agreement otherwise, tenants depend upon landlords to procure fire
insurance.").
118. See Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 813 (Md. 2005) (quoting 6A, J. A.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4055 (2005)).
119. Id. at 814.
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component costs, operate to fix rent prices.120 Therefore, because a tenant does
not implicitly pay fire insurance premiums as a part of his or her rent, the court
dismissed the implied co-insured rationale.12' Finally, even the court in
DiLullo, which followed Sutton's rationale, found that under insurance law,
even though he pays rent and has an insurable interest in the premises, a tenent
is not a co-insured on his landlord's fire insurance policy. Because many, if not
most, courts reject as a legal fiction the implied co-insured rationale, the Sutton
approach fails the second prong of this Note's analysis. Ultimately, because the
implied co-insured rationale flunks both aspects of this Note's two-tier analysis,
the AL should reject this approach.
2. The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties and Economic Waste
Rationale: Stable, Predictable, but Frustrating to
Subrogation's Purpose and Mistaken as to the Nature of the
Insurance Market
The ALl should reject the DiLullo approach because it: (1) frustrates
subrogation's purpose and (2) relies on mistaken assumptions about the nature
of the insurance market. First, because the economic waste and reasonable
expectations of the parties rationale often produces a "no-subrogation" result
similar to the implied co-insured rationale, discussed above in Part IV.B. 1, this
approach also frustrates subrogation's purpose. Specifically, this rationale
often shields tortfeasing tenants from liability, and when it so operates it:
(a) assures that the tortfeasor will enjoy a windfall by virtue of escaping liability
and (b) fails to reimburse the insurer for payments made to the insured when
such compensation stems from third party damage. 122 Consequently, it violates
two of subrogation's three purposes in the landlord-tenant context: (a) assuring
that the tortfeasor will be held legally responsible for the loss by virtue of
blocking the windfall of escaping liability and (b) reimbursing the insurer for
120. See supra Part III.C and accompanying text ("The court argued that component costs;
such as property taxes, construction costs, maintenance expenses, acquisition costs, and
insurance premiums; do not set rent prices, but that a dynamic real estate market of willing
lessors and lessees negotiate these rent prices.").
121. See supra Part III.C and accompanying text (noting that because component costs do
not set rent prices, "a lessor may pursue a claim against a negligent lessee and thereby recover
damages for the loss").
122. See supra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying text (discussing that under the "no-
subrogation" rationale "(a) the 'implied co-insured' tortfeasing tenant enjoys a windfall of
escaping liability; and (b) the insurer may not seek reimbursement for compensation paid as a
result of third party damage").
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payments made to the insured when such compensation stems from third party
damage. 123 Similar to the implied co-insured rationale, the economic waste and
reasonable expectations of the parties rationale frustrates subrogation's purpose
and partially fails the second prong of this Note's two-tier analysis.
Second, in addition to frustrating subrogation's purpose, the reasonable
expectations of the parties and economic waste rationale relies on mistaken
assumptions about the nature of the insurance market. In order to properly
analyze this rationale's failings with respect to this prong of the analysis, this
subsection will separate the rationale into its two components: (1) economic
waste and (2) the parties' reasonable expectations. Ultimately, both of these
rationales rely on mistaken assumptions about the nature of the insurance
market, thus failing the other part of this Note's two-tier analysis.
a. "Palpable Waste": Rare in the Current Insurance Market
With regards to economic waste, this rationale only applies where such
overlapping insurance policies prove "palpably wasteful." 124 In Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. Warner,125 Linda Warner leased part of a duplex from Dana
Taylor. 126 The lease expressly stated that, absent landlord negligence, the
tenant bore responsibility for loss, expense, or damage to the leased property
resulting from the negligence of the tenant or that of her family, employees,
guests, and invitees. 127 Approximately three months into the lease, Scott
Warner, a nephew and guest of Linda Warner, negligently sparked a fire that
caused $43,951 in damages.128 Taylor's fire insurer, Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., subsequently compensated Taylor under their preexisting policy and
pursued a subrogation claim against Linda and Scott Warner.
12 9
In its analysis, the Appellate Court of Connecticut narrowed DiLullo's
economic waste rationale to those situations in which the duplicative insurance
123. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text (noting that subrogation has purposes in
regard to the insured, the tortfeasor, and the insurer).
124. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Warner, 881 A.2d 1065, 1069 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
125. See id. at 1066 (concluding that a tenant in a duplex, whose rental agreement allocated
responsibility to her for damage caused to the property resulting from her negligence, was
subrogated to her landlord's insurer in the amount of the damages paid by the insurer to the




129. Hartford Fire, 881 A.2d at 1066-67.
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proves "palpably wasteful.' ' 130 The court noted that although DiLullo's multi-
unit residence reasonably implicated the public policy against economic waste,
the duplex residence failed to create such a reasonable implication. Rather, the
court concluded that a "pro-subrogation" rule would promote the existence of
two fire insurance policies, "admittedly an overlap but not palpably
wasteful.' 3' Consequently, Hartford stands for the proposition that as long as
subrogation does not create "palpable waste," a "pro-subrogation" rule fails to
violate DiLullo's economic waste rationale.
Although Hartford did not extend this reasoning to all structures, this Note
invites such an extension. First, in nearly every case, either (a) a landlord will
procure fire insurance for the mutual benefit of the tenant or (b) the tenant may
purchase subrogation insurance that is not palpably wasteful. With respect to
mutual fire insurance coverage, landlords typically procure fire insurance for
the mutual benefit of both the landlord and the tenant.' 32 Because the majority
of landlords that procure fire insurance for the mutual benefit of the tenant are
more likely to manage high value properties and access expert legal counsel,
they are more likely, as a matter of good business practice, to protect their
property through self-insurance rather than through reliance on possible legal
claims against their tenants. Conversely, the minority of landlords that procure
fire insurance for personal benefit alone are more likely to manage low value
properties and lack legal sophistication, thereby failing to protect their property
through the more reliable means of self-insurance.13 3 In the former situation,
there is no duplicative insurance and therefore no waste of any kind. In the
latter situation, where the tenant remains vulnerable to an insurer's subrogation
claim, such subrogation protection remains reasonable and not palpably
wasteful. For example, a tenant in Kansas City can purchase $100,000 of
renter's insurance, including a subrogation premium, for $217 a year.'
34
Although the extra $217 policy creates waste, it does not create palpable waste.
130. Id. at 1069.
131. Id.
132. See State Farm Insurance, Renters Insurance Made Simple, http://www.statefarm.
com/insurance/renters/renters.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) (stating that a landlord's insurance
policy typically covers the tenant's building, although it does not cover the tenant's personal
belongings); see also Assurant Specialty Property, Renters Insurance, https://w2.assurant.com/
rentersecurity/gck/?cmsJobnumber=234233 (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) (same) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See supra Part III.A-C and accompanying text (demonstrating illustratively that this
Note explores the minority of landlord-tenant relationships, where the landlord procures fire
insurance for personal benefit alone, and that in such situations the total damages in dispute
ranged from $2,382 in Sutton to $138,000 in Rausch).
134. See E-Mail from Marianne Craig, Underwriting Coordinator III, Multi-Lines
Underwriting-Assurant Specialty Property, (Feb. 16,2006, 5:13 EST) (discussing that because
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Second, with regard to the multi-unit context, multi-unit landlords are
(a) likely to procure fire insurance for the mutual benefit of the tenant,' 35 and
(b) regardless of the landlord's fire insurance policy, multi-unit landlords are
now joining with property insurers to sell renter's insurance to their tenants.
36
With respect to the latter phenomenon, as landlords continue to recognize a
profitable role for themselves in the marketing of renter's insurance, more will
likely seek active involvement. This Note assumes that a universal "pro-
subrogation" default rule would incentivize additional landlords to market
renter's insurance to tenants. Further, in a competitive marketplace, insurers
and landlords would compete for the tenant's business, likely driving down the
price of the subrogation premium to a level of non-palpable waste.
b. Reasonable Expectations: Arise in a Vast Array of Landlord-Tenant
Situations and Are Dynamic in Nature
Next, with regard to the reasonable expectations of the parties, this
rationale fails because (a) the landlord-tenant relationship arises in a vast array
of situations in which there is no uniform reasonable expectation; and
(b) reasonable expectations are dynamic in nature. First, a court should not
create a default rule grounded in an inevitable overgeneralization. Landlord-
tenant settings can be rural, urban, commercial, residential, between parties of
varying degrees of legal sophistication, and between parties of varying degrees
of bargaining power.'37 A law firm leasing commercial space in Manhattan
likely approaches the landlord-tenant relationship with different expectations
than an undergraduate student renting a country house in Lexington, Virginia.
The Massachusetts's Supreme Judicial Court, in Seaco Insurance Co. v.
few claims go into subrogation, the premium does not reflect a significant subrogation expense)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, tenants can purchase $100,000
of renter's insurance, including a subrogation premium, for $229 in Manhattan, NY, $213 in
Lexington, VA, and $217 in Mission Hills, KS. Id.
135. See supra notes 133-34 (proposing that landlords that manage high value property
and that access expert legal counsel, characteristics of a typical multi-unit landlord, are more
likely to procure mutual fire insurance coverage).
136. See Morris Newman, Landlords Moonlight as Insurance Salesmen, NAT'L REAL EST.
INVESTOR, Aug. 1, 2004, at 12 (noting that landlords have teamed up with property insurers to
sell renter's insurance policies, covering personal property and third-party liability, with
landlords acting as "front men" for marketing purposes). Landlords perform this function to
provide tenants with an added service and/or to earn a percentage of the commission. Id.
137. See Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 803 (Md. 2005) (discussing the wide
variety of differing circumstances that arise in the landlord-tenant relationship including
"commercial or residential ... single-unit structure or part of a multi-unit structure").
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Barbosa,'38 recognized one element of this vast variance when it found that
"[c]ommercial tenants tend to be more sophisticated about the terms of their
leases and, unlike residential tenants, commercial tenants generally purchase
liability insurance."1 39 After identifying this distinction, the court decided to
approach commercial and residential tenancies differently.140  Seaco's
approach, however, is grounded in another overgeneralization that all parties in
commercial and residential tenancies are uniform in their degrees of legal
sophistication. In contrast to the hypothetical above, a real-estate attorney
renting a Chicago apartment likely enters into a tenancy with more legal
sophistication than a layman entrepreneur renting a storefront in Prouts, Maine.
Ultimately, because the landlord-tenant relationship is remarkably diverse and
because no uniform reasonable expectation exists, this rationale is ultimately
unconvincing.
Second, the parties' reasonable expectations regarding fire insurance in the
landlord-tenant context are dynamic, likely to change if courts adopt a universal
"pro-subrogation" rule. Therefore, courts, such as DiLullo, are mistaken when
they treat the parties' reasonable expectations as a universal or static factor. In
response, the ALI should recognize this factor's discordant, dynamic nature and
consequently resist reliance on this rationale when formulating a default rule.
C. The "Pro-Subrogation" Rule: Stable, Predictable, Promotes
Subrogation's Purpose, and Understands the Nature of the
Insurance Market
The ALI should endorse the "pro-subrogation" approach because it
provides a stable, predictable bright line rule that promotes subrogation's
purpose and invokes accurate assumptions regarding the nature of the insurance
market. First, the "pro-subrogation" approach provides a stable and predictable
bright line rule. As discussed above in the critique of the case-by-case
approach, law ought to be stable and predictable.' 4' Therefore, when the "pro-
subrogation" approach provides a single default rule that limits judicial
138. See Seaco Ins. Co. v. Barbosa, 761 N.E.2d 946, 950 (Mass. 2002) (distinguishing the
landlord-tenant relationship in the commercial and residential context, noting the different
reasonable expectations of the parties).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 951 (declining to examine commercial and residential tenants similarly, the
court looked to "the terms of the lease and other evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties").
141. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying text ("As a general matter, law ought to be
stable and predictable.").
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discretion, fosters stability, and promotes predictability, it satisfies the future
implications prong of this Note's two-tier analysis.
Second, the "pro-subrogation" result promotes subrogation's purpose. As
outlined in Part II.B, subrogation has "for its purpose the working out of an
equitable adjustment between the parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a
debt by the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it. '' 142 As
previously discussed, with respect to the insurance context, subrogation's
purpose implicates three parties: the insured, the tortfeasing tenant, and the
insurer.143 Subrogation operates to prevent an insured's unjust enrichment;
blocks the tortfeasor from enjoying the windfall of escaping liability for her
wrongdoing; and reimburses the insurer for compensation paid to the insured
resulting from third party negligence. 144 Because the "pro-subrogation" rule
assigns legal liability to the tortfeasing tenant, who in equity and good
conscience ought to discharge the debt, and because it reimburses the insurer
for compensation paid to the insured for damage caused by the tenant's
wrongdoing, this approach protects subrogation's purpose. Consequently, this
rule passes the first part of the second prong of this Note's two-tier analysis.
Finally, the "pro-subrogation" approach complements the contemporary
insurance market. First, as discussed in subsection IV.B.2.a, landlords typically
procure fire insurance for the mutual benefit of both the landlord and the
tenant.1 45 Because the majority of landlords procure fire insurance for the
mutual benefit of the tenant, the "pro-subrogation" result only affects a minority
of tenants. Further, of the affected tenants, most if not all are likely to rent low
value property, for which subrogation insurance is inexpensive. 146 Second, in
the multi-unit context, a "pro-subrogation" approach incentivizes landlords to
market renter's insurance, including subrogation premiums, to tenants. Third,
unlike the case-by-case approach or the "no-subrogation" approach, the "pro-
subrogation" approach respects existing contracts and champions consumer free
142. COUCH, supra note 2, § 222:8.
143. See id. (discussing that in the insurance context, subrogation's purpose implicates the
insured, the tortfeasor, and the insurer); see also supra Part II.B and accompanying text (same).
144. See COUCH, supra note 2, § 222:8 (noting that subrogation operates to prevent unjust
enrichment, assures that the wrongdoer will be held legally responsible for the damages caused,
and reimburses the insurer for payments it has made to the insured in order to remedy the
damage); see also supra Part II.B and accompanying text (same).
145. See supra Part IV.B.2.a and accompanying text (noting that a landlord's insurance
policy typically covers the tenant's building, but does not typically cover the tenant's personal
property).
146. See supra Part IV.B.2.a and accompanying text (demonstrating illustratively that this
Note explores situations where the landlord procures fire insurance for personal benefit alone
and that the total damages discussed ranged from $2,382 in Sutton to $138,000 in Rausch).
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choice. Parties thus remain free to enter into any contractual agreement. Once
completed, however, the court will not reopen the contract to insert new,
"implied" parties. Ultimately, this rule passes both the first and second prong
of this Note's two-tier analysis. As a result, the ALI should endorse this
approach.
In conclusion, as this Note's Introduction suggested, each of the
previously discussed approaches suffers from individual inadequacies. The
"pro-subrogation" approach's weakness is inflexibility. As Rausch noted, an
application of the "pro-subrogation" rule is "either impractical or inequitable to
tenants, or at least certain tenants." 147 If the ALI wishes to address this concern,
it should place an affirmative burden on landlords to disclose to the tenant,
likely in writing, the nature of the insurance that the landlord possesses.
Specifically, if the landlord procured personal fire insurance, the landlord
should inform the tenant of their potential liability. Finally, the sanction for
nondisclosure ought to be the denial of the insurer's subrogation claim.
V. The Importance of Drafting
This Note focuses exclusively on a default solution that would apply
where the landlord and tenant either had no agreement, or an ambiguous one,
outlining each party's insurance responsibilities. "Careful and thoughtful
drafting of leases can eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the problems that
arise as to the insurance and liability of landlord and tenant. 1 48 Even the court
in Page, which favored the "pro-subrogation" approach, concluded that an
insurer would have no subrogation to the landlord's claim against the negligent
tenant "if the parties had agreed as a part of the transaction that insurance
would be provided for the mutual protection of the parties." 149 Also, the court
in Rausch, which favored the case-by-case approach, found that, absent an
exception for a contract of adhesion or an exception for a violation of public
policy, a court, using principles of contract law, will turn to the lease to
determine how the parties allocated risk.' 50 Thus, the parties could avoid the
expense of litigation if they considered the issue of fire insurance in the
planning stage of the agreement, rather than after the damage is done.
147. Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 803 (Md. 2005).
148. John Dwight Ingram, Should an Illinois Tenant Get the Benefit of the Landlord's
Insurance?, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 51, 70 (1996).
149. Page v. Scott, 567 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Ark. 1978).
150. See Rausch, 882 A.2d at 815 (noting that a lease provision that clearly establishes the
liability of the parties is enforceable under contract law; however, it is also subject to the
relevant statutory constraints).
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VI. Conclusion
Currently there exists a jurisdictional split as to whether, absent an
agreement otherwise, a landlord's insurer may pursue a subrogation claim
against a negligent tenant. The ALl should address this issue of legal
divergence and propose a resolution in its Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment. When considering which approach to endorse, the
ALl ought to follow a two-tier analysis, evaluating each rule's future
implications as well as each rule's public policy rationales. In order to provide
a stable, predictable law that promotes subrogation's purpose and that
compliments the contemporary insurance market, the ALI should endorse the
"pro-subrogation" approach. Further, to address concerns of inequitable and
impractical results under this rule, the ALI should place an affirmative duty of
disclosure on landlords, where the consequence of nondisclosure is the denial
of the insurer's subrogation claim.

